Cognitive Dissonance and the West’s Ukraine Strategy.

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Leaders' cognitive dissonance

US President Trump's recent meeting with Ukraine President Zelensky has kicked the doors of discourse wide open. And now European leaders are forced to face some troubling truths about their own involvements in the ongoing conflict.

The war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year, is the product of decades of geopolitical friction—NATO expansion, shifting Ukrainian alliances, and the fallout of the 2014 Maidan uprising. Western leaders, convinced that military aid and sanctions would force Russia into retreat, committed themselves to an approach that assumed inevitability rather than uncertainty. That assumption has proven to be optimistic at best, and yet, instead of adapting, policymakers have locked themselves into a strategy that defies realities.

A couple of years ago, at a Conservative Association Chinese New Year dinner, I made the mistake of suggesting that the war would eventually require negotiation. The response was as if I had proposed surrendering the Isle of Wight to Moscow. The very idea that diplomacy might play a role in ending the conflict was met with a combination of horror and indignant rage. This interaction was not an anomaly—it was a reflection of the cognitive rigidity that has infected much of the Western response to Ukraine.

Now, with Russia slowly gaining ground and Ukraine unable to launch any successful counteroffensive, Western leaders are being forced into an uncomfortable position: they must reconcile their public commitment to Ukrainian victory with the reality that an outright military resolution was always out of reach. Instead of acknowledging this contradiction, they have reframed the mission, shifting from military aid to a long-term security presence in Ukraine, under the guise of peacekeeping.

The Great Rebranding: From Military Aid to ‘Peacekeeping’

Western policymakers have realised that their original vision of supporting Ukraine until it decisively defeats Russia is no longer credible. But rather than confronting this fact, they are engaging in a linguistic retreat, replacing talk of battlefield victories with the promise of a future peacekeeping mission. The UK, under Keir Starmer, has now signalled its willingness to deploy British troops to Ukraine after a ceasefire is reached, ensuring that peace—whatever its terms—has the reassuring presence of Western boots on the ground.

This raises several obvious problems. What exactly will be ‘kept’ in this peacekeeping mission? Peacekeepers typically arrive when both sides agree to a settlement, but given the rhetoric from Western leaders, they appear more committed to Ukraine’s war effort than to any post-conflict stabilisation process. Would these troops oversee a frozen conflict? Would they act as a buffer force between Ukraine and Russian-held territories? Or is this merely a way to justify indefinite Western involvement under different branding?

The most glaring contradiction is that Western leaders still insist that Ukraine must not settle for a disadvantageous peace, while quietly acknowledging that direct NATO involvement in the war would be a catastrophic escalation. Yet, they fail to explain how these two positions can be reconciled. The introduction of a Western peacekeeping force post-ceasefire would place NATO troops on Ukrainian soil, likely in contested areas. If these forces come under attack, would NATO respond militarily? Or would they remain passive observers of a fragile and unenforceable truce?  Certainly, the noise from the current USA administration is that they are not interested in supporting Ukraine to their own detriment.

The Myth of Russian Expansionism

One of the various 'justifications' for continued Western involvement is the claim that Russia has broader territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine. The argument goes something like this: if Ukraine falls, Moscow’s tanks will roll into Poland, the Baltics, and beyond. This narrative has been useful for less-critical thinkers for rallying support, but it is built on fear rather than evidence.

Despite the comparisons to Hitler’s Germany that are frequently thrown around in Western discourse, there is no credible indication that Russia intends to invade NATO countries. Even at the height of Soviet military power, Moscow never attempted to push westward beyond its sphere of influence. The idea that modern Russia has the capability, intention or indeed any interest in or would benefit from launching an assault on fully armed NATO states is not a serious military assessment; it is a political talking point. It's not even an intelligent one.

Yet this fear has served some purpose. It justifies long-term Western engagement, giving policymakers an excuse to treat Ukraine as the last barrier against the Russian horde, rather than as a country that must eventually negotiate a settlement. If European leaders were truly concerned about stability, they would be focusing on a realistic diplomatic resolution, rather than prolonging the war in the hope that something changes in Ukraine’s favour.

Trump’s Reality Check: A Wrench in the Narrative

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has shattered the illusion of Western unity on Ukraine. His recent Oval Office confrontation with President Zelensky (28th February 2025) —where he accused Ukraine of “gambling with World War III”—made it clear that he has no interest in maintaining an open-ended commitment to the war.

Unlike his European counterparts, Trump sees Western involvement as a liability, not a moral crusade. His approach is blunt: the war is dragging on, Ukraine is not winning, and the U.S. should not fund it indefinitely. His willingness to engage directly with President Putin, while unthinkable in most European capitals, is based on a pragmatic acceptance that diplomacy, not perpetual funding, is the only path to resolution.

This forces European leaders to confront uncomfortable questions:

  • If the U.S. reduces its financial and military backing, will Europe compensate for the shortfall?
  • If peace talks evolve, will Western leaders support them, or will they push Ukraine to fight on?
  • If a settlement is reached, what is the purpose of a long-term peacekeeping presence in Ukraine?

For now, European policymakers have chosen to ignore these questions, preferring to repeat slogans about standing with Ukraine “for as long as it takes” without defining what “it” actually is—victory, security, or simply the justification for continued Western involvement.

The Cost of Cognitive Dissonance

Wars do not continue indefinitely by accident; they continue because political leaders refuse to accept when conditions have changed. The shift from military aid to peacekeeping is not a strategy; it is a rationalisation of failure.

By preparing to send peacekeepers while still rejecting the idea of a negotiated settlement, Western leaders have created a paradox. If they believe peacekeeping forces will be necessary, they are admitting that the war will end in a compromise. But if they insist that Ukraine cannot settle for anything less than victory, then they are preparing for a mission that assumes an outcome they do not accept.

Trump’s push for negotiations forces a reckoning that European leaders have avoided for too long. If Ukraine must negotiate, then all the talk of Western peacekeeping should be part of a structured plan for de-escalation, not a rebranded version of military intervention. If negotiations are out of the question, then European leaders must be honest about what they are committing themselves to—because at this point, it looks a lot like indefinite engagement in a war that they refuse to define in clear terms.

At some stage, the West must decide whether it is committed to ending the war or maintaining its involvement in it. If the UK and its European allies truly believe peacekeepers will be needed after a ceasefire, then their priority should be shaping that ceasefire, not prolonging the conflict. If they cannot answer how this ends, then the only thing being “kept” is the illusion that their original strategy is still working.

 

 

An interesting address to the European Parliament by Jeffrey Sachs on 19th February 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lD_KEFpuIro